International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2004 - Hardcover
International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2004 - PDF
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Chapter 22
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF
EXPANDED EUROPEAN ANTITRUST
INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITY FOR
DEFENDANTS IN U.S. PROCEEDINGS
John J. Curtin, Jr., Daniel S. Savrin and Brandon L. Bigelow†
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003,1 adopted by the Council of
Ministers on December 16, 2002, marks a significant change in policy and
procedure for the enforcement of European Community (EC) antitrust
law. “Regulation 1/2003 is based on four key ‘pillars’ of reform:
decentralization of enforcement by involving the [national competition
authorities of Member States (NCA)]; uniform application of EC antitrust
law regardless of the enforcer; close cooperation between EC and Member
State antitrust enforcement agencies; and strengthened powers of
investigation and enforcement.”2 European competition authorities
grappling with the choices this changed enforcement environment present
will not be operating in a vacuum; the expanded investigative and
enforcement powers these authorities possess are likely to have profound
consequences for defendants in civil and criminal proceedings in non-
Member States – and in particular, the United States. Counsel advising a
business either targeted by European competition authorities or
contemplating an appeal for leniency through voluntary cooperation with
those authorities also need to be aware that their client’s exposure to
penalties for antitrust violations may not end at the Atlantic shoreline.
About the Editor:
Barry Hawk, Director, Fordham Corporate Law Institute; Professor of Law, Fordham University and Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom (New York and Brussels)
