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Enforcement Authorities - Chapter 3 - International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005
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International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005 - Hardcover International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005 - PDF ___________________________________________________________________________________ Preview Page Chapter 3
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
Philip Lowe †
The ultimate objective of competition policy is to ensure that open
and competitive markets function effectively, providing incentives for
competition and innovation, and resulting in the best possible choice and
quality of products for consumers at the lowest cost.
Enforcement of the European Union antitrust rules against businesses
is a key tool to achieve this objective, and a key function of the European
Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG Competition). We
continually strive to improve on our enforcement processes and
techniques, and to refine our thinking on policy issues. This paper briefly
describes some of the initiatives in this direction that are currently
occupying us, in particular with respect to cartels, sector inquiries and to
our policy on abuse of dominance (Article 82 of the EC Treaty).
But EU competition policy is not limited to the narrow enforcement
of antitrust rules against businesses – we also have a broader mandate to
bring down barriers to competition, including those resulting from state
subsidies, legislation or other action by EU Member States. This objective
is central to the European Commission’s Lisbon Agenda to improve
competitiveness, growth and employment in the EU. The EC Treaty sets
out specific rules on the control of state subsidies – the so-called “state aid”
rules – but I will not go into detail on these here. The Treaty also provides
the Commission with legal instruments to prevent distortions of
competition caused by Member State action. We think that the dismantling
of State barriers to competition calls for a two-pronged approach,
comprising both “competition advocacy” or “soft law” measures, and
enforcement action. The objective is to both identify barriers to
competition in a proactive way and to seek to bring about reform, whether
on a consensual basis or through enforcement action.
Another issue under debate is the role of private enforcement, and in
particular damages claims brought before the national courts in the EU
Member States, alongside public enforcement carried out by the European
Commission or the EU Member States’ national competition authorities.
We believe that private enforcement can usefully complement public
enforcement in achieving our competition policy objectives, which is why
we are considering a number of issues surrounding private enforcement.
About the Editor:
Barry Hawk is Director of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute and Partner with Skadden Arps (New York and Brussels). He is former Vice Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section and former Chair of the New York State Bar Association Antitrust Section, as well as Professor at Fordham Law School and Visiting Professor at Michigan Law School, Monash University Law School, New York University Law School and the University of Paris.
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