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The Policy of Commitments in Antitrust Law: First Steps and First Update on the French Case - Chapter 2 - International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005
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International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005 - Hardcover International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Corporate Law 2005 - PDF ____________________________________________________________________________________ Preview Page Chapter 2
THE POLICY OF COMMITMENTS IN
ANTITRUST LAW: FIRST STEPS AND FIRST
UPDATE ON THE FRENCH CASE
Bruno Lasserre†
I. INTRODUCTION
Whilst the commitments procedure has for some time been confined
to merger control, where companies offer commitments in order to resolve
competition issues identified by the control authorities and thereby obtain
a positive ruling, its use is gradually becoming more common in the field
of anticompetitive practices.
Of course, even in this area, commitments have never been
completely disregarded by competition authorities, but they tended to be
used on a merely informal basis. This was notably the case with EC law.
Under French law on anticompetitive practices, the commitments
procedure is seen here as a procedure that ends proceedings against a
company, in exchange for the company in question adopting commitments
that are made binding by the competition authority. It appeared during
2004, with the adoption of Ordinance 2004-1173 dated 4 November 2004.1
Although this new procedure is recent, the procedures applicable
before the Conseil de la concurrence did not completely disregard
commitments. As we will see, they were already one of the conditions for
the implementation of a procedure introduced into French law in 2001.
This “no contest” procedure enables defendant companies to obtain a
reduction in their fines by declining to challenge the objections against
them and by adopting commitments.
The new commitments procedure therefore constitutes an additional
weapon in the Conseil de la concurrence’s arsenal. The Conseil moved
quickly to underline the importance it places on accepting commitments,
and the reason for doing so.
† Chairman of the Conseil de la concurrence, Paris. The
About the Editor:
Barry Hawk is Director of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute and Partner with Skadden Arps (New York and Brussels). He is former Vice Chair of the ABA Antitrust Section and former Chair of the New York State Bar Association Antitrust Section, as well as Professor at Fordham Law School and Visiting Professor at Michigan Law School, Monash University Law School, New York University Law School and the University of Paris.
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